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INTRODUCTION
In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, the Supreme Court
reshaped general personal jurisdiction (also called “all-purpose jurisdiction”),
announcing that defendants are subject to general personal jurisdiction where
their contacts were “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”1 The Court reaffirmed this “at home” test in
Daimler AG v. Bauman in 20142 and clarified where individuals and corporations were typically “at home.”3 To date, the Court has never expressly applied
this new vision of general personal jurisdiction to unincorporated entities, leading to confusion in the federal district courts.4
1
2
3
4

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014).
Id. at 137.
See infra Section II.B.3.
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This article examines this gap in the law: Where are unincorporated entities
subject to general personal jurisdiction? Part I of this article provides context
by examining the three key, overlapping jurisdictional concepts (subject matter
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and venue) and reviewing how these concepts apply to individuals and corporations. Part II focuses on unincorporated
entities and examines the possible tests for general personal jurisdiction proffered by dicta from the Supreme Court and suggested by lower courts. Part III
sets out our recommended approach for where unincorporated entities are subject to general personal jurisdiction, that is:
An unincorporated entity (such as an LLC, LLP, general partnership, or limited
partnership) is subject to general jurisdiction where its contacts are so constant
and pervasive as to render it essentially “at home” in the forum state. With respect to an unincorporated entity, the place of formation and the principal place
of business are paradigm bases for general jurisdiction.
The rule is not that an unincorporated entity may be subject to general jurisdiction only in a forum where it was formed or has its principal place of business; it
is simply that those places are paradigm all-purpose forums. In some circumstances, the contacts of an entity’s members with a forum may be so constant
and pervasive as to render the unincorporated entity “also at home” in that forum
as well.5

We argue that this test is consistent with lower court holdings, with Supreme Court dicta, and with the logic of the Court’s general jurisdiction jurisprudence. Finally, in Section III.D this article provides guidance to lower courts
in applying the proposed test to various unincorporated entities.
I.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE LARGER JURISDICTIONAL PICTURE

A. The Interplay of Personal Jurisdiction, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and
Venue
The focus of this article is personal jurisdiction, a court’s power over the
parties before it. However, personal jurisdiction overlaps with two other jurisdictional issues, subject matter jurisdiction and venue.6 These three interrelated
concepts direct litigants to the proper forum for filing claims and provide the
basis for challenges to the selected forum. While each of these concepts embodies a separate jurisdictional concern, they often rely on similar terminology
and related issues. Each one asks, in different ways, “where is a party at
home?”

5

See infra Section III.C.2. This proposed rule deliberately parrots the language the Supreme
Court adopted for corporations in Goodyear and Daimler.
6 Some include venue as a “jurisdictional concept,” and that is the approach taken in this
article. Others would exclude it, using “jurisdiction” only to refer to personal jurisdiction and
subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3801 (3d ed. 2008) (arguing against the use of “jurisdictional” to include
venue).
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1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Venue
The first concept, subject matter jurisdiction, is the requirement that a court
have the authority to resolve the dispute before it.7 State courts are courts of
general subject matter jurisdiction and can hear all matters that are not specifically reserved for the federal courts.8 By contrast, federal courts have “limited
subject matter jurisdiction.”9 Article III of the United States Constitution establishes the outer boundaries of federal judicial power and vests Congress with
the authority to establish and ordain the lower federal courts.10 Congress,
through statute, has the power to determine the authority of the federal district
courts.11
While Congress has authorized several bases for federal district court subject matter jurisdiction, the one most relevant to our article is diversity jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), litigants may bring claims that are between
diverse citizens when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.12 A key aspect of diversity jurisdiction is the determination of the parties’ citizenship.13
This requires courts to interpret and apply the term “citizen” from § 1332(a) to
all types of parties that might appear in the suit, including individuals, corporations, and a variety of unincorporated entities.14 In interpreting “citizenship,”
the Court has consistently made clear that the determination of this issue should
remain, foremost, a congressional one.15
Venue is the second jurisdictional concept that informs the question of
whether the chosen forum is proper. Unlike subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, venue is not a limit on a court’s power.16 Rather, it is a concept grounded in the convenience of the selected forum for the litigants and the

7

Id.
13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3522.
9 Id.
10 U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2.
11 See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 (1978) (“Constitutional power is merely the first hurdle that must be overcome in determining that a federal
court has jurisdiction over a particular controversy. For the jurisdiction of the federal courts
is limited not only by the provisions of Art. III of the Constitution, but also by Acts of Congress.”) (citations omitted); see also 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3522.
12 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2018).
13 Id.
14 See infra Sections I.B; II.A.
15 See infra Section II.A.
16 Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 316 (2006) (citing Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 168 (1939)). “The jurisdiction of the federal courts—their
power to adjudicate—is a grant of authority to them by Congress and thus beyond the scope
of litigants to confer. But the locality of a lawsuit—the place where judicial authority may be
exercised—though defined by legislation relates to the convenience of litigants and as such
is subject to their disposition. This basic difference between the court’s power and the litigant’s convenience is historic in the federal courts.” Neirbo, 308 U.S. at 167–68; see also
14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, at § 3801.
8
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court itself.17 Venue is a statutory concept with no constitutional connection.18
For the purposes of this article, we will be focusing on part of 28 USC § 1391,
the general-federal-venue statute, which controls venue in the federal district
courts.19 Under § 1391(b)(1), venue is proper in “a judicial district in which any
defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.”20 Once again we must ask where a party is “from”; but, just as
with subject matter jurisdiction, this is an area where the Court defers to Congress, seeking to simply apply the statute’s definition of residency.21
2. Personal Jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction, the final concept that determines the appropriateness
of a selected forum, is the focus of this article. Personal jurisdiction is a limitation on a court’s power over litigants that is derived from the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.22 A court,
whether state or federal, must have the authority to bind the litigants to the
judgment it renders.23 Under the Due Process Clause, a litigant may challenge
the court’s authority by establishing that the chosen forum is unconstitutionally
burdensome.24
The origin of personal jurisdiction in the Fourteenth Amendment and the
limit it puts on a forum makes it distinct from venue and from subject matter
jurisdiction.25 Namely, the Supreme Court is not simply interpreting a congressional grant of jurisdiction; rather, when ruling on matters of personal jurisdiction it is refining and explaining a jurisprudence it has created itself.26
Today, the Supreme Court recognizes two forms of personal jurisdiction,
“general” and “specific” personal jurisdiction.27 General jurisdiction, the sub17

Wachovia, 546 U.S. at 316 (venue is primarily a matter of convenience) (citations omitted); Neirbo, 308 U.S. at 167; see also 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, at § 3801.
18 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, at § 3801 (noting that while “personal jurisdiction implicates constitutional as well as statutory concerns, venue is wholly a statutory matter”).
19 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2018). The general venue statute in § 1391(b) lays venue based on
either event giving rise to the claim or on the residency of the defendant. Id. The residency
provision is discussed infra Sections I.B, II.A.
20 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) (emphasis added).
21 See infra Sections I.B, II.A.
22 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 311, 316 (1945).
23 Id. at 316 (noting that “the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is
grounded on their de facto power over the defendant’s person.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P.
4(k)(1)(A) (directing that service over a defendant will establish personal jurisdiction in the
federal district courts when the defendant would be subject to personal jurisdiction in the
state courts “where the [federal] district court is located”).
24 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313.
25 Id. at 316–17 (using a due process test grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment).
26 We explore the importance of this differing role for the Court in Section III.A.
27 The Court has at times referred to these concepts by different names: it has called “general” jurisdiction “all-purpose” jurisdiction and called “specific” jurisdiction “conductlinked” jurisdiction. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014); see also
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ject of this article, allows a forum to exercise personal jurisdiction over “any
and all claims” against a defendant.28 In contrast, specific jurisdiction allows a
forum to assert personal jurisdiction with a much lesser showing of minimum
contacts by a defendant, but only as to claims that “arise[] out of or relate[] to”
those contacts.29
For much of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court focused on specific
jurisdiction, leaving the doctrine of general jurisdiction largely undeveloped.30
In the 1984 splintered decision of Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A.
v. Hall, the Supreme Court reiterated that a forum would have general jurisdiction over a defendant when the defendant’s contacts with the forum were “continuous and systematic.”31 The Court reasoned that at some point a defendant’s
contacts with a forum are so voluminous that due process is not offended even
by a suit with no connection to the forum.32 However, the Court remained silent
for almost three decades following Helicopteros, offering no clarification on
when a defendant’s contacts with a forum would be sufficiently continuous and
systematic as to render it subject to general jurisdiction.33
It was only in Goodyear, in 2011, and again in Daimler, in 2014, that the
Supreme Court refocused on general jurisdiction and reformulated its prior
pronouncements into the “at home” test.34 Today, general jurisdiction exists
when defendants’ “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’
as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”35 The Daimler Court
argued that this “at home” test had several advantages, namely, it was relatively

Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 727–28
(1988) (discussing the distinction between specific and general jurisdiction).
28 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127 (citations omitted).
29 Id. at 126–27 (tracing the evolution of the Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence and
noting that, after International Shoe, specific jurisdiction can be supported by a “single or
occasional” contact with the forum if the contact gave rise to the claim).
30 See id. at 129 (describing the Court’s decisions on specific jurisdiction and noting that
“[o]ur post-International Shoe opinions on general jurisdiction, by comparison, are few.”).
31 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall 466 U.S. 408, 409, 416 (1984). The
phrase “continuous and systematic” was originally used by the Court in International Shoe.
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
32 The Helicopteros Court held that “mere purchases” by the defendant did not meet the
high standard for contacts required for general jurisdiction, even when the purchases (of several helicopters and parts) from the forum occurred over several years and were for significant amounts, and even when the contract was negotiated in the forum by the defendant’s
CEO and the defendant’s staff later visited the forum for training. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at
411, 414, 418.
33 Helicopteros was decided in 1984, and the Court’s next opinion, Goodyear, was in 2011.
See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); Helicopteros,
466 U.S. 408 (1984).
34 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 117, 127; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919, 924.
35 Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Daimler, 571
U.S. at 127. Daimler at times used the phrase “so constant and pervasive” rather than the
classic “so continuous and systematic” formulation. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 122.
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“simple” and easy to apply.36 Moreover, the “at home” test was clear and provided litigants with transparency “afford[ing] plaintiffs recourse to at least one
clear and certain forum in which a . . . defendant may be sued on any and all
claims.”37
This new general jurisdiction test forces the Court to ask, “where is a defendant at home?” As we detail below in Section I.B, the Daimler Court itself
spelled out the answer to this question for individuals and for corporations, but
the Supreme Court has not yet explained where unincorporated entities are “at
home.”38 This article suggests an answer.
B.

An Overview of the Treatment of Individuals and Corporations in Subject
Matter Jurisdiction, Venue and General Personal Jurisdiction

This section provides an overview of the application of established jurisdictional law to individuals and corporations. Specifically, it will explore how
individuals and corporations are treated for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, for venue, and for general personal jurisdiction. This overview will highlight the overlapping use of terms in these separate jurisdictional concepts and
suggest how the Court should craft a general jurisdiction rule for unincorporated entities.
1. Treatment of Individuals in Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Venue, and
General Personal Jurisdiction
For an “individual”, that is a natural person, the key test for all the jurisdictional concepts is “domicile.”39 Individuals are “citizens” for purposes of diversity jurisdiction in the state of “domicile”;40 “reside” under the express terms of
the federal venue statute in the judicial district of “domicile”;41 and under the
Supreme Court’s new “at home” test, the paradigm place in which individuals
are subject to general personal jurisdiction is the state of “domicile.”42 In other
words, when the Court selected a test for the paradigm forum with general personal jurisdiction over an individual, it copied the test it had crafted for diversi36

Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137 (explaining that the “at home” test “[has] the virtue of being
unique—that is, each [affiliation] ordinarily indicates only one place—as well as easily ascertainable.”).
37 Id.
38 See infra Sections I.B, II.B.
39 Domicile is “the place where that individual has a true, fixed home and principal establishment, and to which, whenever that person is absent from the jurisdiction, he or she has
the intention of returning” 13E WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3612; see also Domicile,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
40 13E WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3611.
41 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1) (2018) provides that “[f]or all venue purposes . . . a natural person
. . . shall be deemed to reside in the judicial district in which that person is domiciled.”
42 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137 (holding that “[f]or an individual, the paradigm forum for the
exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile”).
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ty jurisdiction and the one that Congress had elected to use for venue. Moreover, because an individual can have only one domicile, there will be only one
state where an individual defendant is subject to general personal jurisdiction.43
2. Treatment of Corporations in Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Venue, and
General Personal Jurisdiction
In contrast, corporations are treated very differently across jurisdictional
concepts. For venue, Congress has defined the “residency” of a defendant corporation as any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.44 Since this
covers judicial districts in which a corporation is subject to either general or
specific personal jurisdiction at the time the suit is commenced, a corporation
typically “resides” in multiple judicial districts for venue purposes.45
A different test is applied when determining a corporation’s “citizenship”
for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity
jurisdiction). For many years, the Supreme Court held that a corporation was a
citizen only of its state of incorporation.46 However, in 1958, Congress expressly provided that a corporation was a citizen of both its state(s) of incorporation
and its principal place of business (PPB).47 The Supreme Court recently clarified that a corporation can have only one PPB, determined by the “nerve center” test, that is, the place where the corporate “officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities.”48 Thus today, a corporation typically has

43

See id.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) (“For all venue purposes . . . an entity with the capacity to sue and
be sued in its common name under applicable law, whether or not incorporated, shall be
deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to
the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question and, if a plaintiff,
only in the judicial district in which it maintains its principal place of business . . . .”). An
additional venue provision, 28 U.S.C § 1391(d), explains how to apply this rule to a corporation in a state with multiple judicial districts. In addition, if the corporation is a plaintiff—a
provision triggered if it sues the United States—it resides for venue purposes only in its PPB.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2).
45 For a review of the ways general and specific personal jurisdiction interact with venue,
see John P. Lenich, A Simple Question That Isn’t So Simple: Where Do Entities Reside for
Venue Purposes?, 84 MISS. L.J. 253, 277–83, 294–98 (2015).
46 Initially, the Supreme Court held that a corporation was not a “citizen” at all, but it later
reversed that position, holding that it was a citizen of the state of its incorporation. See
Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 187–88 (1990) (reviewing the history of the
Court’s rulings on the citizenship of corporations).
47 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2018); see Carden, 494 U.S. at 196 (exploring the Court’s various
rulings on the citizenship of a corporation and commenting that “Congress has not been idle.
In 1958[,] it revised the rule established in Letson, providing that a corporation shall be
deemed a citizen not only of its State of incorporation but also ‘of the State where it has its
principal place of business.’ 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c).”).
48 Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010). The nerve center test is explored infra
Section III.C.2.a.
44
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two “citizenships” for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction—its state of incorporation and its PPB (usually its headquarters).49
When the Court was faced with the need to define the paradigm forum(s)
for “at home” general personal jurisdiction for a corporation, the Court announced it would adopt a corporation’s state of incorporation and PPB.50 The
Goodyear Court did leave open the possibility that a corporation could be “at
home” in a place other than its state of incorporation or principal place of business, if its contacts were “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home.”51 The Daimler Court expressly confirmed this possibility but
ruled out the idea that merely doing business, even at a high level over multiple
years, would be enough: “Accordingly, the inquiry under Goodyear is not
whether a foreign corporation’s in-forum contacts can be said to be in some
sense ‘continuous and systematic,’ it is whether that corporation’s ‘affiliations
with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at
home in the forum State.’ ”52
Daimler has left some commentators and lower courts wondering whether
any level of contacts—absent the classic fact pattern of Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co.,53 where the defendant’s president and corporate headquarters relocated to the forum state (admittedly on a temporary basis) during wartime activities—would be enough to meet the “at home” test.54
In sum, as it had done with individuals, the Court seemingly “borrowed” its
general jurisdiction rule from diversity jurisdiction and selected a test that (1)
produced relatively few (likely two at most) forums and (2) was typically easy
to apply. Indeed, when selecting the state of incorporation and PPB as the para49

Under § 1332(c)(1) a corporation has two sources of citizenship: its state(s) of incorporation and its PPB. This typically yields two citizenships, although if a corporation is both incorporated and has its PPB in the same state this will yield only one citizenship. The language of 1332(c) makes it possible for a corporation to acquire an additional citizenship if it
is incorporated in more than one state, but the realities of business make this highly unlikely.
50 The Court explained, “ ‘the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the
individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.’ With respect to a corporation, the place of incorporation
and principal place of business are ‘paradig[m] . . . bases for general jurisdiction.’ ” Daimler
AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
51 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). “Goodyear
did not hold that a corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction only in a forum where it
is incorporated or has its principal place of business; it simply typed those places paradigm
all-purpose forums.” Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137.
52 Daimler, 571 U.S at 138–39 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)) (alteration in original).
53 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (discussed and cited with
approval in Daimler, 571 U.S. at 129–30).
54 Id. at 438, 447–48; see also Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. Interstate Warehousing, Inc., 90
N.E.3d 440, 445 (Sup. Ct. Ill. 2017) (summarizing the narrow interpretation given to the “at
home” test in Daimler). But see Zoe Niesel, Daimler and the Jurisdictional Triskelion, 82
TENN. L. REV. 833, 869–70 (2015) (arguing that the Court intended an expansive reading of
“at home”).
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digms for “at home” general personal jurisdiction, the Court cited as an advantage that “[t]hose affiliations have the virtue of being unique—that is, each
ordinarily indicates only one place—as well as easily ascertainable.”55
II. GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION FOR UNINCORPORATED ENTITIES: THE
ISSUE
The application of jurisdictional principles to unincorporated entities is
conflicted. In some instances, unincorporated entities are treated like corporations, but at other times, they are not.56 As we will explore in greater detail in
this Part, in traditional diversity jurisdiction, unincorporated entities are not
treated like corporations because they are not seen as distinct entities, but rather
as simply a collection of their members.57 However, in certain specialized subject matter cases, Congress has stepped in and dictated that all entities, both incorporated and unincorporated, be treated alike.58 Congress has adopted this
same approach in the venue statute, electing to treat all business entities the
same.59 This dissonance has, not surprisingly, caused some confusion in lower
courts when it comes to deciding where an unincorporated entity should be subject to “at home” general jurisdiction.
A. Treatment of Unincorporated Entities in Subject Matter Jurisdiction and
Venue
1. Diversity Citizenship of Unincorporated Entities
a. Citizenship of Unincorporated Entities in Traditional 1332(a)
Diversity Cases
For the purpose of determining diversity jurisdiction under 1332(a), business entities exist in only one of two categories: either they are incorporated or
unincorporated.60 Each has its own distinct test for purposes of traditional di55

Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137.
An initial issue is whether an unincorporated entity even has the capacity to sue or be
sued in its own name. Historically, state common law did not allow an entity to sue in its
common name; rather all the individual members of the entity had to be joined. Today, most
states have statutes that allow an unincorporated entity to sue or be sued in its own name. 6A
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 1564. If the entity is litigating in federal court, FRCP 17(b)
provides that an entity’s capacity to sue is typically determined by state law and only grants
an entity the ability to sue or be sued “in its common name” in federal question cases. FED.
R. CIV. P. 17(b). See also 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 1564. Thus, an unincorporated
entity in a diversity case may lack the capacity to sue, if state law takes the original common
law approach. Id. This article assumes that the entity has the capacity to sue and be sued in
its own name but questions where such an entity is subject to general personal jurisdiction.
57 See infra Section II.A.1.a.
58 See infra Section II.A.1.b.
59 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) (2018) and discussed infra Section II.A.2.
60
Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 187–90 (1990).
56
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versity jurisdiction. While Congress has statutorily defined the citizenship of a
corporate entity (i.e., its state of incorporation and its PPB),61 it has not provided a definition of citizenship for unincorporated entities.62 In the absence of a
congressional mandate, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an unincorporated entity has no separate citizenship.63 Rather, it takes on the citizenship
of its members (the “Carden rule”).64
In simple terms, the Carden rule means that an unincorporated entity may
have multiple citizenships, often many more than the dual citizenship of a corporation. For instance, if Partnership P1 has five partners and these individuals
are domiciled in (and are, therefore, citizens of) Ohio, Missouri, Washington,
North Dakota and Texas, then Partnership P1 is a citizen of every one of those
states. It can be even more expansive if one of the partners is a corporation (in
which case Partnership P1 picks up the citizenship of the member corporation—its state of incorporation and PPB), or if one of the partners is another
partnership, P2 (in which case Partnership P1 picks up the citizenship of every
member of P2).65 As the circuit courts have repeatedly explained, “the citizenship of unincorporated associations must be traced through however many layers of partners or members there may be.”66
This is extreme for some unincorporated entities. For instance, a union acquires the citizenship of every worker affiliated with it, and a commercial trust
acquires the citizenship of every shareholder.67 This can lead these entities to

61

28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2018).
As discussed infra Section II.A.1.b, in the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act, Congress did
provide a definition of an entity’s citizenship, but this definition applies only in mass actions.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10) (2018). Additionally, in § 1332(c)(1), which deals with suits against
insurers, Congress provided a definition that covered both incorporated and unincorporated
insurers and included the insurer’s state of incorporation and PPB. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
63 Carden, 494 U.S. at 189; see also Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S.
Ct. 1012, 1015 (2016); 13E WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3630. This rule is sometimes
called the “Chapman” rule (after an earlier case) but is now typically referred to as the
“Carden” rule.
64 Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1015; Carden, 494 U.S. at 189, 195–96.
65 Under Carden, this includes limited partners who play no active role in managing the
partnership. Carden, 494 U.S. at 195.
66 Meyerson v. Showboat Marina Casino P’ship, 312 F.3d 318, 319–20 (7th Cir. 2002) (Circuit Rule “requires any unincorporated association to identify the citizenship of every member”); see also D.B. Zwirn Special Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. Mehrotra, 661 F.3d 124, 125
(1st Cir. 2011); Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 420 (3d Cir. 2010);
Delay v. Rosenthal Collins Grp., L.L.C., 585 F.3d 1003, 1005 (6th Cir. 2009); Debra R. Cohen, Limited Liability Company Citizenship: Reconsidering an Illogical and Inconsistent
Choice, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 269, 303 (2006) (noting that this “multi-layered analysis that is
both time-consuming and expensive”); Matthew Hoffman, Unraveling the Jurisdictional Citizenship of Master Limited Partnerships, 4 HLRE: OFF REC. ARTICLES 127, 133 (2014) (noting that the test is difficult to apply to MLPs).
67 Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1015 (noting that the citizenship of a union is that of every affiliated worker and that a commercial trust has the citizenship of every shareholder).
62
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have hundreds, if not thousands, of citizenships for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.68
However, while the Carden rule (an unincorporated entity acquires its
members’ citizenships) often leads to the entity having multiple citizenships, it
does not include two places. For purposes of subject matter jurisdiction, an unincorporated entity is not a citizen of the state in which it was legally created
(the “formation state”) nor is it a citizen of the state where it has its PPB.69
To what entities does the Carden rule apply? The Court’s response seems
to be that the rule applies to every entity known to common law that is not a
corporation.70 Thus, despite the variety of businesses recognized in state law,
there are two categories of entities for purposes of federal diversity—
corporations and “other”—where “other” covers every other type of entity. The
Court has seemingly erected and actively defended a “doctrinal wall” between
corporate and unincorporated entities.71
Over the years, the Court has placed in the “other” entity basket not just
partnerships, but also trade unions, joint stock companies, limited partnerships,
limited partnership associations and, most recently, commercial trusts.72 In68

After Americold, commercial trusts are citizens of every state in which a shareholderbeneficiary is domiciled, and many such trusts have hundreds, even thousands of members.
S.I. Strong, Congress and Commercial Trusts: Dealing with Diversity Jurisdiction PostAmericold, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1021, 1024 (2017); see also Hoffman, supra note 66, at 133
(discussing MLPs).
69 See, e.g., Kauth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Ill., 852 F.2d 951, 959 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that
“[t]he citizenship of a partnership” is irrelevant to diversity); A.D.S. Developers, Inc. v.
Tucker, 263 F. Supp. 986, 987 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (observing that an entity did not have the citizenship of its state of formation or its PPB, only of its members). Of course, if one of the
entity’s members happens to be a citizen of the state of its formation or PPB, it will pick up
citizenship that way. “[I]f all the members of an LLC are citizens of a state other than the
state of creation, under the persons composing rule[,] the LLC is not a citizen of the state of
creation.” See also Cohen, supra note 66, at 297 (noting that LLCs under the Carden rule are
neither citizens of the state of formation nor where they have their PPB); Hoffman, supra
note 66, at 134 (noting the same for MLPs).
70 Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1015; Carden, 494 U.S. at 196–97; see also 13F WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 6, § 3630.1 (noting that “there is now abundant case law from courts at all levels
of the federal judiciary throughout the country to the effect that the Carden principle is not
limited to the facts of that case and applies to a wide range of unincorporated associations.
Accordingly, whenever a partnership, a limited partnership, a joint venture, a joint stock
company, a labor union, a religious or charitable organization, a governing board of an unincorporated institution, or a similar association brings suit or is sued in a federal court, the
actual citizenship of each of the unincorporated association’s members must be considered in
determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists.”) (citations omitted).
71 The Court has characterized this rule as a “doctrinal wall.” United Steelworkers of Am.,
AFL–CIO v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 151 (1965). The Court repeated this phrase
in Americold and in Carden. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1017 (refusing to “tear . . . down”
this “doctrinal wall”); Carden, 494 U.S. at 190 (“reaffirming ‘the doctrinal wall . . . ’ ”)
72 The Supreme Court has applied this rule to commercial trusts, Americold, 136 S. Ct. at
1015–16; limited partnerships, Carden, 494 U.S. at 195–96; labor unions, Steelworkers, 382
U.S. at 153; limited partnership associations, Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177
U.S. 449, 454 (1900); and joint stock companies, Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682
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deed, as Justice Scalia explained in Carden v. Arkoma Assocs, the Court has
“firmly resisted extending [the test for corporations] to other entities.”73 Justice
Scalia’s categorical approach in Carden—either “corporation” or “noncorporation”—is not pretty. Even Justice Scalia admitted that it “can validly be
characterized as technical, precedent-bound, and unresponsive to policy considerations raised by the changing realities of business organization,” but, as he
observed, “that has been the character of our jurisprudence in this field.”74 Advocating that Congress, not the Court, should step in if a more nuanced, policybased approach was needed,75 Justice Scalia rejected the Carden dissent’s calls
that the Court undertake an assessment of the distribution of the power and
control in each non-corporation’s structure.76 In Justice Scalia’s view:
The 50 States have created, and will continue to create, a wide assortment of artificial entities possessing different powers and characteristics, and composed of
various classes of members with varying degrees of interest and control. Which
of them is entitled to be considered a “citizen” for diversity purposes, and which
of their members’ citizenship is to be consulted, are questions more readily resolved by legislative prescription than by legal reasoning, and questions whose
complexity is particularly unwelcome at the threshold stage of determining
whether a court has jurisdiction. We have long since decided that, having established special treatment for corporations, we will leave the rest to Congress; we
adhere to that decision.77

Even in the 1990s when, as Justice Scalia predicted, all states began to recognize a new form of artificial entity,78 limited liability companies (LLC’s), the
federal courts, following Justice Scalia’s lead in Carden, overwhelmingly treat-

(1889). The one exception is a sociedad en comandita—a civil law entity—which the Court
in the 1930s held was a citizen of its place of formation and PPB. Puerto Rico v. Russell &
Co., 288 U.S. 476, 480–81 (1933). The Carden Court left this precedent undisturbed but emphasized that it was an exceptional case because it was a civil law entity. Carden, 494 U.S.
at 189–90; see also 13F WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3630 (discussing this exception).
73 Carden, 494 U.S. at 189.
74 Id. at 196.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 187 n.1. The dissent of Justice O’Connor argued that the court must examine who
were the real parties to the controversy by looking at who possessed the power and control
over the partnership’s business and litigation. Id. at 198, 201–06.
77 Id. at 197.
78 While the first LLC statute was adopted by Wyoming in 1975, “[b]y 1996, all 50 states
and the District of Columbia had enacted legislation recognizing LLCs.” DEBORAH
BOUCHOUX & CHRISTINE SGARLATA CHUNG, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS LAW IN FOCUS 698
(2016). Following the IRS’s 1998 ruling which allowed LLCs to elect to be treated as a partnership for purposes of taxation, the number of LLCs soared. “[B]y 2007, more LLCs were
formed than corporations in 46 states.” Id.; see also Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New
King of the Hill: An Empirical Study of the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs
Formed in the United States Between 2004–2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years
2002–2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 460, 462, 466 (2010).

20 NEV. L.J. 693

706

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:2

ed these new entities as “not corporations.”79 While noting the similarity between these new structures and corporations, the circuit courts have simply applied the holding of Carden (that these entities take on the citizenship of all
their members),80 and emphasized that Congress, and not the courts, should be
the one to adjust the Carden rule.81 This reluctance to revisit the seemingly disjointed and inconsistent treatment of unincorporated entities has continued despite the explosive growth of unincorporated entities; in fact, by 2007, there
were more LLCs than corporations formed in 46 states.82
Scholars, too, have repeatedly argued that the Court should abandon the
Carden rule, often advocating that the corporate test (using the state of incorporation and PPB) be expanded so all business entities are treated alike for diversity jurisdiction.83 Yet, any hope that the Supreme Court might revisit its ap79

For a list of all courts holding that LLCs are to be treated as unincorporated entities see
13F WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3630.1 n.12 (citing to numerous cases from every circuit).
80 See, e.g., Siloam Springs Hotel, L.L.C. v. Century Sur. Co., 781 F.3d 1233, 1234 (10th
Cir. 2015); D.B. Zwirn Special Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. Mehrotra, 661 F.3d 124, 125–26
(1st Cir. 2011); Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 420 (3d Cir. 2010);
Delay v. Rosenthal Collins Grp., L.L.C., 585 F.3d 1003, 1005 (6th Cir. 2009); Harvey v.
Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 542 F.3d 1077, 1080–81 (5th Cir. 2008); Johnson v. Columbia
Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006); Gen. Tech. Applications, Inc. v.
Exro Ltda, 388 F.3d 114, 121 (4th Cir. 2004); Rolling Greens MHP v. Comcast SCH Holdings L.L.C., 374 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 2004); GMAC Commercial Fin. L.L.C. v.
Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 357 F.3d 827, 828–29 (8th Cir. 2004); Handelsman v. Bedford
Vill. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 48, 51–52 (2d Cir. 2000); Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150
F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1998).
81 See, e.g., Grynberg v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 805 F.3d 901, 906, 908 (10th
Cir. 2015) (applying the rule to MLPs and opining that “despite practical similarities between corporations and certain types of unincorporated entities, . . . it was up to Congress,
not the courts, to make further adjustments.”); GMAC Commercial Fin., 357 F.3d at 829
(Congress, not the Courts, should address the citizenship of LLCs); Cosgrove, 150 F.3d at
731. The Supreme Court again called for Congress to act in Americold Realty Tr. v. Conagra
Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1017 (2016) (“we reaffirm that it is up to Congress if it wishes
to incorporate other entities into 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)’s special jurisdictional rule.”). The
most recent dispute in the federal circuit courts is over the citizenship of a “Lloyd’s syndicate.” For a summary of conflicting case law, see 13F WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6,
§ 3630.1.
82 See BOUCHOUX & CHUNG, supra note 78, at 698; Chrisman, supra note 78, at 460.
83 There is a wealth of literature spanning several decades that calls for the rejection of the
Carden rule for a variety of unincorporated entities. For more recent examples, see Cohen,
supra note 66, at 272–73 (on LLCs); Hoffman, supra note 66, at 133 (on MLPs); Strong,
supra note 68, at 1058 (on commercial trusts); Kristen Curley, Note, Achieving the Purpose
of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: Why Courts Should Abandon the Current Treatment of
LLCs Under Section 1332, 31 TOURO L. REV. 477, 477–78 (2015) (on LLCs). Most advocate
applying a version of the corporate test (state of formation and PPB) to unincorporated entities, arguing that this is simple to apply and better reflects both modern business practice and
the goals of diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 66, at 306–07; Hoffman, supra note 66, at 133–34; Strong, supra note 68, at 1079. Some scholars advocate that the Supreme Court change the test, while others, concluding that this is unlikely, call for Congressional action. Compare Strong, supra note 68, at 1027–28 (calling for Congress to override
Americold), and Hoffman, supra note 66, at 134 (calling for congressional action), with Co-

20 NEV. L.J. 693

Spring 2020]

FINDING A “HOME”

707

proach was dashed in 2016 in Americold Realty Trust v. Conagra Foods, Inc.84
Faced with a new unincorporated entity case, this time involving a commercial
trust, the unanimous Court once again stuck to the Carden rule and once again
called on Congress to act:
We also decline an amicus’ invitation to apply the same rule to an unincorporated entity that applies to a corporation—namely, to consider it a citizen only of
its State of establishment and its principal place of business. . . . When we last
examined the “doctrinal wall” between corporate and unincorporated entities in
1990, we saw no reason to tear it down. . . . Then as now we reaffirm that it is up
to Congress if it wishes to incorporate other entities into 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)’s
special jurisdictional rule.85

Despite these calls for reform, Congress has not altered the “doctrinal wall”
established in Carden. Congress has been less concerned about the lack of clarity and uniformity for unincorporated entities than it has been with the possibility of overburdening the federal courts under an expanded rule of diversity jurisdiction.86 Therefore, the Carden rule continues despite its many critics.
b. Citizenship of Unincorporated Entities Under CAFA
In 2005 Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) designed
to expand federal subject matter jurisdiction over class actions and mass tort
actions.87 The statute contained a requirement that the parties be diverse and
defined the citizenship of unincorporated entities for the purposes of CAFA
subject matter jurisdiction.88 Under CAFA, “an unincorporated association
shall be deemed to be a citizen of the State where it has its principal place of
business and the State under whose laws it is organized.”89 Thus, Congress expressly rejected the Carden rule for actions controlled by CAFA: here any entity, whether incorporated or not, is a citizen of its PPB and state of formation.90
hen, supra note 66, at 291–94 (calling for the Supreme Court to act and arguing against deference to Congress).
84 Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1017.
85 Id.
86 Amy L. Levinson, Developments in Diversity Jurisdiction, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1407,
1408 (2004) (“Congress generally favors restricting diversity jurisdiction out of its concern
for the rising caseload of the federal courts.”); Christine M. Kailus, Diversity Jurisdiction
and Unincorporated Businesses: Collapsing the Doctrinal Wall, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1543,
1560 (2007) (same).
87 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No, 109-2 (2005) (“[t]o amend the procedures
that apply to consideration of interstate class actions to assure fairer outcomes for class
members and defendants, and for other purposes.”); see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2018)
(SMJ requirements); 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2018) (Removal provisions).
88 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
89 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10).
90 Id. “For qualifying class and mass actions, therefore, CAFA abrogates the long-standing
rule that an unincorporated association shares the citizenship of each of its members for diversity purposes. In effect, this legislation overrules the Supreme Court’s decision in Carden
v. Arkoma Associates . . . in the context of class and mass actions. Instead, unincorporated
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Congress apparently created this exception to the traditional Carden rule
because it was concerned that insurance companies (often parties to mass actions), while sometimes corporations, were often unincorporated entities.91 By
making the test of citizenship the same for corporate and unincorporated entities, it eliminated this “anomaly” and achieved its goal of ensuring that all entities were treated alike.92
Federal courts applying this CAFA provision have concluded that it covers
all types of unincorporated entities.93 But, by its own terms, it only applies in
CAFA actions.94 As a result, in an action in federal court under both CAFA and
traditional diversity subject matter jurisdiction, an unincorporated entity has to
plead different citizenships in the same litigation.95 For CAFA, it is a citizen of
its PPB and state of formation, but for traditional diversity jurisdiction, it has
the citizenship of each of its members.96
2. Residency for Purpose of Venue of Unincorporated Entities
For venue purposes, Congress has provided that an unincorporated entity,
when a defendant, resides “in any judicial district in which such defendant is
subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in
question” and, when a plaintiff, resides “only in the judicial district in which it
maintains its principal place of business.”97 This venue provision treats all entiassociations receive the same treatment as corporations in determining their citizenship for
diversity jurisdiction.” 13F WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3630.2.
91 SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005. S.
REP. NO. 109–14 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 43. For a discussion of the Senate Report, see 13F WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, at § 3630.2.
92 “It is clear that a desire to treat unincorporated associations and corporations similarly in
the class action context motivated CAFA’s sponsors . . . .” 13F WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6,
at § 3630.2.
93 Ferrell v. Express Check Advance of S.C. L.L.C., 591 F.3d 698, 705 (4th Cir. 2010)
(“[T]he term ‘unincorporated association’ in § 1332(d)(10) refers to all non-corporate business entities. This interpretation not only serves the language and history of § 1332 but also
the purpose of broadening the reach of CAFA. Thus, a limited liability company, such as
Express Check, is an ‘unincorporated association’ within the meaning of § 1332(d)(10).”);
see also Heckemeyer v. NRT Mo., LLC, No. 4:12CV01532 AGF, 2013 WL 2250429, at *6
(E.D. Mo. May 22, 2013) (“This Court finds the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit persuasive
and concludes, as did the Fourth Circuit, that Congress chose to treat LLCs like corporations
for purposes of determining citizenship under CAFA.”).
94 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10).
95 Geismann v. Aestheticare, L.L.C., 622 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1098 (D. Kan. 2008) (“These
two definitions of citizenship necessitate distinct factual support and reveal another material
difference between Sections 1332(a) and 1332(d).”).
96 See e.g., Harvey v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 542 F.3d 1007, 1080 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting
the different citizenships). In cases pled under both CAFA and traditional diversity jurisdiction, the court must apply two different citizenship tests to the same entity. See Geismann,
622 F. Supp. 2d at 1097–98.
97 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) (2018). The reference to where “plaintiffs” reside links to
§ 1391(e)(1) which allows venue in a civil action against an officer or employee of the United States to be based on plaintiff’s residency. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1). This venue provision
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ties the same.98 In 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2), Congress expressly provided that for
venue purposes corporate and unincorporated entities should be treated alike:
“an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued in its common name under applicable law, whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to reside . . . .”99
The venue statute takes the opposite approach to the “doctrinal wall” the Court
has erected in traditional diversity jurisdiction between corporate and unincorporated entities. Moreover, Congress provides that where a corporation or unincorporated entity is a plaintiff, it resides “only in the judicial district in which
it maintains its principal place of business,” once again showing a willingness
to expand its traditional test for corporations to unincorporated entities.100
Finally, just as with corporations, unincorporated entities are likely to “reside” in multiple judicial districts as defendants, since they reside in every judicial district in which they are subject to either general or specific personal jurisdiction.101 There will be multiple forums identified as appropriate for
purposes of venue; this is in line with the goal of venue to simply ensure the
forum is convenient to the parties, witnesses and courts.
In sum, when Congress has acted in recent years—in venue in 2011 and
CAFA in 2005—it has expressly adopted provisions that treat corporate and
unincorporated entities alike. However, despite requests from the Supreme
Court, Congress, to date, has not stepped in to adopt this unified approach in
traditional diversity jurisdiction, leaving the Court’s Carden rule in place. This
could well reflect conflicting policy goals. While in CAFA Congress wanted to
expand the number of class actions that could be filed in federal court, Congress has far less interest in expanding core diversity jurisdiction.102 By leaving
the Carden rule in place—an unincorporated entity acquires multiple “citizenships” under 1332—it is far more likely that diversity will be destroyed and the
suit will lack federal subject matter jurisdiction.

was part of the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No.
112-63, 125 Stat. 758 (2011). For an extensive discussion of this venue provision and its application to unincorporated entities, see generally Lenich, supra note 45.
98 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) (2018). The only distinction is that an additional venue provision,
28 U.S.C. § 1391(d), which explains how to apply this rule in a state with multiple judicial
districts, expressly applies only to “corporations.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d); see Lenich, supra
note 45, at 256 (noting that the courts have largely ignored this distinction, but arguing that
courts should instead be faithful to the text, even if the provisions are “inherently contradictory”).
99 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) (emphasis added); see also Lenich, supra note 45, at 266, 272 (citations omitted) (noting that Congress’ express aim in passing the 2011 venue amendments
was to ensure “parity of treatment” between corporate and unincorporated entities, in line
with recommendations of the ALI).
100 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2).
101 Id.
102 Levinson, supra note 86, at 1408; Joshua J. Wes, Note, The Anti-Injunction and All Writs
Acts in Complex Litigation, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1603, 1639–40 (2004).
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B. General Jurisdiction for Unincorporated Entities
1. Unincorporated Entities: Same or Different?
Against this backdrop, we face the question of where unincorporated entities should be subject to general personal jurisdiction. As detailed above, when
faced with the questions of where individuals and corporations were “at home”
for general jurisdiction, it appears that the Court chose to “copy” the test for
“citizenship” used in diversity jurisdiction.103 If the Court uses the same approach for unincorporated entities, copying the Carden rule, an unincorporated
entity would be “at home” anywhere one of its members was “at home” (and
not “at home” in its state of formation or PPB).
However, the above discussion also reveals a conflicted approach to unincorporated entities. Sometimes they are thrown in with corporations (for CAFA
subject matter jurisdiction and for venue purposes, all business entities follow
the same rule),104 but at other times unincorporated entities follow a distinct
rule (for purposes of determining their citizenship for diversity jurisdiction).105
Is the Court likely to adopt an “at home” general jurisdiction test that simply
extends the rule for corporations to all entities, or will it craft a new and distinct
rule for non-corporations? Some hints to the likely approach the Court will take
may be suggested by accidental dicta in Daimler.
2. The Supreme Court’s Ruling/Non-Ruling in Daimler
In Daimler, plaintiffs sought to argue that Daimler (a German corporation)
was subject to general jurisdiction in California due to the actions of its subsidiary (the importer, Mercedes–Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA)), who plaintiffs argued acted as Daimler’s “agent” when it sold cars in California.106 While the
case centered on the relationship between Daimler and MBUSA, MBUSA was
never made a party.107
The subsidiary MBUSA, which plaintiff’s sought to use to tie Defendant
Daimler to California, was an LLC, a fact expressly noted by the Court.108 In its
description of the facts, the Court stated: “[j]urisdiction over the lawsuit was
predicated on the California contacts of Mercedes–Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA),
a subsidiary of Daimler incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of
business in New Jersey.”109 The Court more fully describes MBUSA as follows: “MBUSA, an indirect subsidiary of Daimler, is a Delaware limited liability corporation. MBUSA serves as Daimler’s exclusive importer and distributor
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

See supra Section I.B.1.
See supra Section II.A.1.b, II.A.2.
See supra Section II.A.1.a.
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 121, 134–36 (2014).
Id. at 122, 123, n.3.
Id. at 121, 123.
Id. at 121 (emphasis added).
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in the United States . . . . Although MBUSA’s principal place of business is in
New Jersey, MBUSA has multiple California-based facilities . . . .”110 As is evident from these quotes, the Daimler Court described the LLC, an unincorporated entity, as a “corporation” having a “principal place of business” and a
“state of incorporation.” This confused terminology raises the question of
whether the Court fully realized that MBUSA, as an LLC, was an unincorporated entity.
In the Daimler case, plaintiff never named MBUSA as a defendant, and
Daimler apparently conceded that MBUSA, LLC was subject to general jurisdiction in California, so the question of where an LLC was subject to personal
jurisdiction was not technically at issue.111 As the Court noted:
Daimler, on the other hand, failed to object below to plaintiffs’ assertion that the
California courts could exercise all-purpose jurisdiction over MBUSA. But see
Brief for Petitioner 23, n. 4 (suggestion that in light of Goodyear, MBUSA may
not be amenable to general jurisdiction in California); Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 16, n. 5 (hereinafter U.S. Brief) (same). We will assume then, for
purposes of this decision only, that MBUSA qualifies as at home in California.112

Nonetheless, although the Court expressly stated that the question of
whether MBUSA was “at home” in California was not at issue in the case,
when asking if Daimler was “at home” in California, the Court said the following: “Here, neither Daimler nor MBUSA is incorporated in California, nor does
either entity have its principal place of business there.”113 The Court implies
that for both corporations (Daimler) and LLCs (MBUSA) the test for “at home”
general jurisdiction is the same: state of incorporation and PPB.114
There is certainly no “ruling” in Daimler as to where an unincorporated entity is subject to “at home” jurisdiction. It may be that while the Court
acknowledged that MBUSA was an LLC, it did not focus on the fact that an
LLC is not a “corporation.” Therefore, the Court’s possible suggestion that it
would apply the state of incorporation and PPB test to the LLC may have been
offered without full consideration of the fact that the LLC was an unincorporated entity.115 Even if the Court did intend to tip its hat as to where an unincorporated entity is subject to “at home” jurisdiction, given that the Court ex110

Id. at 123.
Id. at 134 (emphasis added).
112 Id.
113 Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
114 See infra Section II.B.3 (discussing district courts’ reaction to this dicta in Daimler); see
also Lenich, supra note 45, at 290 (arguing that “[t]he ease with which the Court blended
corporations and limited liability companies indicates that there is no difference between
them for purposes of general personal jurisdiction”).
115 It may also be an indication that, contrary to the rulings of the Circuits, the Court intends
to treat LLCs as corporations for all purposes including diversity subject matter jurisdiction,
but this was obviously not before the Court. See supra note 80 (detailing all the Circuits’
holdings that an LLC is not a corporate entity for diversity jurisdiction).
111
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pressly stated that this issue was not before the Court, it can hardly be regarded
as binding precedent. Nonetheless, as discussed below, several district courts
have picked up on this language in Daimler and applied this general jurisdiction test to unincorporated entities.
3. Lower Court Split on General Jurisdiction for Unincorporated Entities
Several lower courts have relied on the language in Daimler and held that
an LLC is subject to general “at home” jurisdiction in “the state of formation
and principal place of business.” A leading case is the 2016 decision in Finn v.
Great Plains Lending, LLC, where the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania explained:
While Great Plains is an LLC and not a corporation, the reasoning of Daimler
applies with equal force. Although the language of Daimler speaks only in terms
of corporations, the subsidiary at issue in Daimler was Mercedes-Benz USA,
LLC (MBUSA). In determining whether the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California could exercise general jurisdiction over DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft (Daimler), the Supreme Court concluded that the
district court could not exercise general jurisdiction over Daimler because “neither Daimler nor MBUSA is incorporated in California, nor does either entity
have its principal place of business there.” Even though MBUSA is an LLC, the
Court looked to MBUSA’s place of incorporation and principal place of business to determine whether it was essentially at home in California and thus subject to general jurisdiction in the State.116

Several other district courts have reached the same conclusion, that the test
for “at home” jurisdiction for an unincorporated entity, such as a LLC, is its
state of formation and PPB, citing favorably to Finn and Daimler.117
116

Finn v. Great Plains Lending, L.L.C., No. 15-4658, 2016 WL 705242 at *3 n.3 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 23, 2016) (citations omitted).
117 See, e.g., Spencer v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-00427-DN, 2019 WL 1382285
at *5 (D. Utah Mar. 27, 2019) (citing Daimler and concluding that the “[p]aradigm forums
for general jurisdiction over a company are its place of formation and its principal place of
business” and applying this standard to an LLC); Stubbs v. REV Grp., Inc., No. 2:18-CV00913-RDP, 2018 WL 6504396 at *2 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 11, 2018) (“LLCs are subject to general jurisdiction in the state of their formation and where they have their principal place of
business”); In re Packaged Seafood Prods. Antitrust Litig., 338 F. Supp. 3d 1118, 1139 n.14
(S.D. Cal. 2018) (adopting “Daimler’s two-part paradigmatic location approach for general
jurisdiction and tests both the place of organization and the principal place of business” for a
limited partnership); Griggs v. Swift Transp. Co., No. 2:17-CV-13480-MCA-SCM, 2018
WL 3966304, at *2 (D. N.J. Aug. 16, 2018) (noting that “[c]ourts have applied the Daimler
rules to limited liability companies with ‘equal force’.”); Blocker v. Black Entm’t Television, L.L.C., No. 3:17-CV-01406-AC, 2018 WL 3797568, at *6 (D. Or. June 26, 2018) (explaining that “[a] court should consider the LLC’s place of ‘incorporation’ and principal
place of business, rather than to the citizenship of all of an LLC’s members . . . .”); Miller v.
Native Link Constr., L.L.C., No. 15-1605, 2017 WL 3536175, at *30 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 17,
2017) (“Under the rule of Daimler as it has been applied to limited liability companies, Native Link will only be subjected to general jurisdiction in the state of its organization and
principal place of business.”); Duncanson v. Wine & Canvas IP Holdings L.L.C., No. 1:16CV-00788-SEB-DML, 2017 WL 6994541, at *1–2 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 20, 2017) (reversing prior
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However, another district court, also citing to Daimler and two diversity
jurisdiction cases, concluded that an LLC is subject to general jurisdiction both
in its own state of formation and where its sole-member was incorporated and
had its principal place of business.118
It is fair to say that there is now a mild trend in district courts to hold that
LLCs are subject to general “at home” jurisdiction in the “state of their formation” and their “principal place of business.” Indeed, one court reversed its
position—withdrawing an opinion that found an LLC at home in the state of
each of its members, and instead adopting the Finn approach that an LLC is only at home in its state of formation and the state of its PPB.119 However, this
approach has not been uniformly embraced. At least one district court has applied the citizenship test for unincorporated entities to determine where they
would be subject to general personal jurisdiction by looking to the citizenship
of the members.120
To date, no court has addressed the issue for other unincorporated entities
such as partnerships, trade unions, or LLPs; however, one article, relying on
Daimler, concludes that the place of formation and PPB test for general jurisdiction will apply to all unincorporated entities121

conclusion on the issue) (“Based on this discussion in Daimler (which identified an LLC’s
state of formation and principal place of business in deciding general jurisdiction), other district courts have ruled that a limited liability company, like a corporation, is ‘at home’ in the
state of its formation and the state where it has its principal place of business.”); Magna
Powertrain De Mexico S.A. De C.V. v. Momentive Performance Materials USA L.L.C., 192
F. Supp. 3d 824, 828 (E.D. Mich. June 16, 2016) (explaining “personal jurisdiction rules
governing corporations generally have been applied to limited liability companies as well.”);
Mitchell v. Fairfield Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., L.L.C., No. 2:15-CV-00188-MHH, 2016 WL
1365586, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 6, 2016) (“Several courts have extended the rationale of
Daimler to LLCs.”).
118 Allen v. IM Sols., L.L.C., 83 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1203–04 (E.D. Okla. 2015).
119 Duncanson v. Wine & Canvas IP Holdings L.L.C., No. 1:16-CV-00788-SEB-DML,
2017 WL 6994541, at *1–3 (S.D. Ind. 2017).
120 Head v. Las Vegas Sands, LLC, 298 F. Supp. 3d 963, 975–76 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (finding
general personal jurisdiction did not exist over the defendant unincorporated associations
because there were no “members in Texas”). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court on appeal with no discussion of this issue, but appeared to implicitly accept the district court’s interpretation of the general personal jurisdiction test, noting that the unincorporated “Casino Defendants are not Texas residents.” Head
v. Las Vegas Sands, Ltd. Liab. Corp., 760 F. App’x 281, 284 (5th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added).
121 Lenich, supra note 45, at 290–91 (presuming on the basis of the dicta in Daimler that the
place of formation and PPB test for general jurisdiction will apply to all unincorporated entities, including limited liability companies, limited liability partnerships, limited partnerships,
unincorporated associations and joint ventures).
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III. PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION FOR
UNINCORPORATED ENTITIES
A. The Appropriateness of Judicial Resolution
Because the Court has expressed great reluctance to address the seemingly
awkward and inconsistent application of the Carden test to unincorporated entities in diversity jurisdiction,122 it is critical to demonstrate the need for judicial
resolution of the general personal jurisdiction question. First, there is good reason for the Court to use judicial restraint in the context of diversity jurisdiction.
As we discussed above, Article III of the Constitution directs that the subject
matter jurisdiction of the federal courts is within the power of Congress.123 The
Court has traditionally limited its role in interpreting the subject matter jurisdiction statute to avoid judicial overreach into the authority expressly granted by
the Constitution to Congress.124 Therefore, while the Court might identify some
of the unfortunate results of the Carden rule to unincorporated entities, it is up
to Congress to legislate a solution. Moreover, Congress has acted as recently as
2005, in CAFA, when it changed the definition of citizenship of unincorporated
entities in class and mass-action cases, leaving the Carden rule intact in other
areas.125 Thus, the Court may be wise to leave to Congress the definition of the
citizenship of unincorporated entities for subject matter jurisdiction.126
By contrast, personal jurisdiction has its origins in the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.127 Personal jurisdiction jurisprudence is a creature of
the Supreme Court: a constitutional doctrine that prevents the imposition of
overly burdensome suits on parties against their consent.128 The Court should
not exercise the restraint and deference it shows in the context of subject matter
jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction, unlike subject matter jurisdiction, is not
about interpretation of a congressional statute.129 Unlike in subject matter jurisdiction, Congress cannot simply step in and clarify the gap in general personal
jurisdiction law.130 Moreover, Daimler applies to both the federal and state
122

Americold Realty Tr. v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1015 (2016); Carden v.
Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195–96 (1990). These opinions are discussed supra in Section II.A.1.a.
123 Discussed supra Section I.A.1.
124 See supra Section I.A.1.
125 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10) (2018). Discussed supra Section II.A.1.b. Congress also acted
as recently as 2011 to amend venue. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) (2018) (amended in 2011).
126 Scholars have long called for Congress to act in this area. See Cohen, supra note 66, at
294, 303 (arguing against judicial deference on the issue).
127 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 311 (1945).
128 See id. at 319.
129 See id. at 311.
130 Id. at 324. There is a limited role for Congress in the context of personal jurisdiction,
namely in the creation of a federal long arm statute or by amendment to Rule 4. See Stephen
E. Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1301, 1317–
18 (2014) (arguing that Congress could amend Rule 4 to permit nationwide personal juris-
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courts.131 Congress has no authority to craft a statutory response to Daimler
that could reach the state courts. Therefore, the Court need not show deference
to Congress and should clarify this issue.
Finally, there is good reason for the Court to provide clarity. As the current
Court has repeatedly stated, there should be predictability and certainty on jurisdictional matters.132 Parties should be able to predict answers to jurisdictional matters, and courts should have consistent approaches to resolving jurisdictional disputes, because a lack of clarity increases litigation expenses,
unnecessarily extends disputes, and leads to an inefficient operation of our judicial system.133
B. Considering the Daimler Approach: The Court’s Apparent Requirements
for a General Jurisdiction Test
The Court in Goodyear and Daimler seemed to suggest that several attributes were desirable in any test for general jurisdiction. Of course, the Court requires there to be an extremely high level of contacts with that forum; it has repeatedly stated that, to satisfy general jurisdiction, the defendant’s contacts
with the forum must be “ ‘so continuous and systematic’ as to render [the de-

diction in the federal courts and have personal jurisdiction in the federal courts limited under
the 5th Amendment). However, Congressional authority would still be limited by the Fourteenth Amendment so long as Congress chooses to continue to link personal jurisdiction in
the federal courts to the existence of personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the state
court in which the district court is located. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
131 Even if Congress alters Rule 4 or creates a federal long arm statute, the state courts’ jurisdiction will remain limited by the Fourteenth Amendment. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
132 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137(2014); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S.
77, 94–95 (2010).
133 In addition to clarifying the confusing language in Daimler, the Court should take up this
issue to clarify some of the inconsistent messaging about the due process concerns raised in
general jurisdiction and the underlying goals promoted by the Court. Traditionally, personal
jurisdiction has been understood as a recognition of the limits on a court’s power to exercise
judgment over non-resident defendants when the forum was unduly burdensome. For this
reason, when the forum is not one in which the defendant would predict or be able to foresee
being hauled into court, the forum is typically an unconstitutional selection by the plaintiff.
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). This is often the
focus for specific personal jurisdiction analysis. See id.; Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 473, 475 (1985). However, this concept is still implicit within general jurisdiction analysis. Under general jurisdiction, the forum is not unconstitutional because it is the
defendant’s “home;” therefore, the defendant can always foresee the possibility of litigating
in it. The Court in Daimler, however, seemed to move the focus on predictability, or foreseeability of the suit, to the plaintiff. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137 (reasoning that the “at home”
test “afford[s] plaintiffs recourse to at least one clear and certain forum in which a corporate
defendant may be sued on any and all claims”). For example, the Court noted that general
jurisdiction afforded the plaintiff with an option to easily and judiciously identify an appropriate forum for her suit. Id. This is an important goal of jurisdictional rules; however, the
Court should again clarify that the focus for personal jurisdiction analysis is in the fairness it
affords the defendant.
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fendant] essentially at home in the forum State.”134 However, one of the equally
consistent messages of both Goodyear and Daimler is that in-state activities
that are continuous and systematic alone are not enough for general jurisdiction; the affiliation between the defendant and the forum must be so strong as to
make the defendant “at home.”135
The Court also repeatedly emphasized a desire that only a very limited
number of forums would qualify for general jurisdiction—ideally only one or
two.136 In Daimler, the Court explained, “Goodyear made clear that only a limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to allpurpose jurisdiction there.”137 Indeed, in settling on domicile as the paradigm
for where an individual is “at home” and on state of incorporation and PPB for
where a corporation is “at home,” the Court praised these tests because they
had “the virtue of being unique—that is, each ordinarily indicates only one
place.”138
The Court also emphasized that any test should be easy to apply so that the
forum is “easily ascertainable.”139 It touted as a virtue of the paradigms it
adopted that these “afford plaintiffs recourse to at least one clear and certain
forum” in which the defendant can be sued on any claim.140 Thus, the Court
seems likely to prefer a test for unincorporated defendants that is simple to apply, over one that is fact-intensive or nuanced. The Court also suggested that
“predictability” is very important in jurisdictional rules, commenting that
“[s]imple” rules “promote greater predictability.”141
These considerations—a high level of contacts by defendant; only limited
forums; easy application and predictability—seem likely to influence the
Court’s decision as to where an unincorporated entity will be subject to general
jurisdiction.
C. Examining Possible Tests and the Proposed Test
Obviously, the Court will hold that unincorporated entities (just like individuals and corporations) are subject to general jurisdiction in the forum(s)

134

Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127 (citations omitted); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A.,
v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011); see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9 (1984) (citations omitted).
135 Daimler, 571 U.S.at 127.
136 Id. at 137.
137 Id. (emphasis added).
138 Id. (emphasis added).
139 Id.; see also Lenich, supra note 45, at 288, 290–91 (noting that “[b]oth Hertz and Daimler reflect a preference for jurisdictional rules that are relatively easy to apply.”).
140 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137 (emphasis added); see also Lenich, supra note 45, at 290–91
(arguing that allowing general jurisdiction over an unincorporated entity in its PPB would
provide a convenient forum for the defendant entity to defend itself and support the Court’s
desire to have a clear and convenient place for the plaintiff to file).
141
Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137.
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where they are “essentially at home.”142 The debate is over what the Court will
announce as the “paradigm bases” for general jurisdiction over unincorporated
entities.
The main options the Court seems likely to consider in framing an “at
home” test are either the subject matter jurisdiction test for unincorporated entities that focuses on the members (the so-called Carden rule) or some version of
the “at home” test for corporations that focuses on the entity’s state of formation and PPB.
Another possible option is to use the test for where an entity resides for
purposes of venue143 to determine where an unincorporated entity resides for
purposes of at home jurisdiction. This seems highly unlikely for three reasons.
First, such a test will often lead to an unincorporated entity being “at home” in
multiple places (everywhere it is subject to jurisdiction) and the test (because it
relies on personal jurisdiction analysis) would be fact intensive and hard to apply. Both of these violate the Court’s demand that, ideally, the test for at home
personal jurisdiction should “ordinarily indicate[] only one place” and be “easily ascertainable.”144 Second, the Court could have adopted such a test for corporations (who also have the same residency rule), and yet it did not.145 Finally,
and most tellingly, this circular definition would mean that an entity would be
subject to general “at home” jurisdiction wherever it was subject to either general or specific jurisdiction—completely effacing the distinction between the
two. Thus, this option seems a non-starter.
Given that the most likely tests for the Court to consider are the Carden
rule or a version of the “at home” test currently used for corporations, we will
consider each of these variations in turn.
1. Rejecting the “Where Members Are at Home” Test
The Court could copy the Carden rule it created in subject matter jurisdiction to determine where an unincorporated entity would be considered “at
home.” Using such an approach, an unincorporated entity would be subject to
general “at home” jurisdiction wherever its members are subject to “at home”
jurisdiction. This does have the advantage of predictability. For every type of
defendant (individual, corporation, and now unincorporated entity), the test for
“at home” would be identical to the test for citizenship in traditional diversity
jurisdiction. Such a uniformity of approach may lead to fewer errors in court
selection. It could also be argued that it would be easy to apply. In any case in
federal court under diversity jurisdiction, the parties should have alleged, and

142
143
144
145

See supra Section II.B.1.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2018).
Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137.
Id. at 141.
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the trial court double-checked, that there was diversity jurisdiction.146 This
check requires the court to identify all the entity’s members and ascertain their
citizenships, so the court would have already done all the work needed to determine whether the entity was subject to general jurisdiction in the selected forum.
On the other hand, declaring that an unincorporated entity is “at home”
wherever its members are “at home” flies in the face of some of the Court’s announced policy goals.147 First, while the test may be easy to apply in diversity
jurisdiction cases in federal court because the parties and the trial court should
have already ascertained an entity’s citizenship (and thus, where it is at home),
this is not true for cases in federal court under federal question subject matter
jurisdiction where inquiry into the parties’ citizenship is not required. This is
even truer in state courts, where diversity is not required so the courts never
have to consider the federal diversity jurisdiction citizenship rules. Therefore,
for state courts in particular, an “at home” test that copies the subject matter jurisdiction test will add a layer of unwelcome complexity.
In addition, the “at home where members are at home” test may not
achieve the certainty or predictability the Court wanted.148 A plaintiff may not
know all the members of an entity or where they are “at home,” making it far
from “clear and certain” where there will be general jurisdiction.149 Under this
test, an unincorporated entity will typically not be “at home” in the state of its
formation or where it has its PPB (facts that are often easy to learn from public
records).150 Instead, plaintiffs might have to trace the citizenship of the unincorporated entity through all the layers of members, a task that has often proved
burdensome in diversity jurisdiction cases.151 Consequently, plaintiffs may be
far from “clear and certain” where an entity is subject to general jurisdiction.152
146

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1) (requiring a statement of subject matter jurisdiction for every
claim). It is the burden of the person asserting jurisdiction (either as plaintiff or removing
defendant) to meet this burden. See, e.g., Am.’s Best Inns, Inc. v. Best Inns of Abilene, L.P.,
980 F.2d 1072, 1073–74 (7th Cir. 1992). Most Circuits hold that allegations of subject matter
jurisdiction citizenship may not be pled upon information and belief but require actual
knowledge of all the members’ citizenship. Leslie Coletti & Thomas E. Rutledge, Diversity
Jurisdiction and Unincorporated Entities: Recent Developments, A.B.A.: BUS. L. TODAY,
Sept. 2016 at 1–2 (discussing split). The trial court must itself check that subject matter jurisdiction exists. 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, at § 3522.
147 See supra Section III.B (examining Daimler’s policy goals).
148 See supra Section III.B (examining Daimler’s policy goals).
149 Cohen, supra note 66, at 275, 303 (noting that ascertaining an LLC’s citizenship is “a
multi-layered analysis that is both time-consuming and expensive” and that “the membership
of an LLC is not public information”); Hoffman, supra note 66, at 133 (discussing MLPs);
Coletti & Rutledge, supra note 146, at 3; Matthew C. Dodge, Determining the Citizenship of
LLC Members for Diversity Purposes: Seemingly Simple, Difficult Enough to Compel an
Amendment to 28 U.S.C. 1332(c)(1), 80 TUL. L. REV. 661, 673 (2005).
150 Supra Section II.A.1.a.
151 See, e.g., Meyerson v. Showboat Marina Casino P’ship, 312 F.3d 318, 319–21 (7th Cir.
2002) (reminding lawyers that “the citizenship of unincorporated associations must be traced
through however many layers of partners or members there may be[,]” and threatening sanc-
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Equally, while the Court has repeatedly emphasized that general jurisdiction requires an extremely high level of contacts,153 application of the Carden
rule to determine “at home” general jurisdiction for unincorporated entities
would render personal jurisdiction over the entity in forums with a weak connection to the operations of the entity itself. Because the Carden rule uses the
citizenship of every member of an unincorporated entity, there could possibly
be general jurisdiction over an entity in a forum whose only connection with
the entity is that one member of the entity is a citizen.154 For instance, under
this test, Partnership P (with individual partners domiciled in Ohio, Missouri,
Washington, North Dakota and Texas) would be “at home,” and subject to general jurisdiction, in every one of those states. Yet, when examining the operations of the partnership itself, the only contacts between the partnership and the
forum could be that a partner is domiciled in that state; and, under the Supreme
Court’s Carden rule, it could even be a limited partner who has no day-to-day
control over the partnership’s affairs.155 This result seems contrary to the
Court’s desire to identify a high level of forum contacts as the key to general
jurisdiction.156
Finally, and we think likely most persuasive for the Court, is that the “at
home where members are at home” test is likely to lead to multiple places
where an entity is “at home” since every member’s home will count, as is illustrated by the example above. This will be all the more so if an entity’s members
are other entities, a more common occurrence in today’s business world. Rather
than ordinarily yielding “only one place” for “at home” general jurisdiction for
the defendant, this test will likely indicate “multiple homes.”157 This conflicts
tions, including suspension from practice, because counsel had failed to comply with the
Circuit Rule 28(a)(1) that required any unincorporated association to identify the citizenship
of every member); see also D.B. Zwirn Special Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. Mehrotra, 661
F.3d 124, 125 (1st Cir. 2011); Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 420 (3d
Cir. 2010); Delay v. Rosenthal Collins Grp., L.L.C., 585 F.3d 1003, 1005 (6th Cir. 2009).
For an example of a typical order directed at the plaintiff, see Avery Family Farm, L.L.C. v.
Highlands Country Club Prop. Owner’s Assoc., Inc., No. 2:09CV57, 2010 WL 584006, at *1
(W.D.N.C. Feb. 16, 2010) (noting that plaintiff is “required to file with the court a Notice of
Citizenship of Plaintiff, in which it names and identifies the citizenship of all its constituent
members or partners, and, for any such constituent members or partners that are also LLCs
or partnerships, to identify the citizenship of their respective constituent members or partners, until all such constituents are fully identified”); see also Cohen, supra note 63, at 275,
275 n.30, 303, 303 n.208; Dodge, supra note 149 at 672–73; Hoffman, supra note 66, at 133.
152 See supra Section III.B (examining Daimler’s policy goals).
153 See supra Section III.B (examining Daimler’s policy goals).
154 Discussed supra Section II.A.1.a.
155 Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195–96 (1990) (internal citations omitted);
discussed supra Section II.A.1.a.
156 See supra Section III.B (examining Daimler’s policy goals).
157 See supra Section III.B (examining Daimler’s policy goals). As noted supra Section
II.A.1.a, at note 65, some unincorporated entities have hundreds, if not thousands, of members and so would likely be subject to general jurisdiction in every state—hardly the “limited” number of forums the Court is seeking.

20 NEV. L.J. 693

720

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:2

with the Court’s objective that general jurisdiction be in a very “limited” number of forums—ideally “only one place.”158
In short, while copying the diversity citizenship test for unincorporated entities may offer a parallel approach to the Court’s position for individuals and
corporations, it contradicts the Court’s espoused goals of simplicity, certainty,
predictability, limited forums, and a focus on a forum with an extremely high
level of defendant contacts.159 For these reasons, we recommend the Court reject such an approach.
2. The Proposed Test: “State of Formation, PPB and Also at Home”
The other alternative is to recognize a test that focuses on an unincorporated entity’s state of formation and PPB as the paradigm “homes” for the purpose of general jurisdiction. This is the position the Daimler Court may have
implicitly endorsed, and it is the one that has the support of a majority of the
federal trial courts that have addressed the issue.160
This article proposes that the Court adopt such a test, but with an important
qualification, the addition of the “also at home” provision set out below in the
second paragraph of our test and discussed in Section III.C.2.c. Our proposed
test is:
An unincorporated entity (such as an LLC, LLP, general partnership, or limited
partnership) is subject to general jurisdiction where its contacts are so constant
and pervasive as to render it essentially at home in the forum State. With respect
to an unincorporated entity, the place of formation and principal place of business are paradigm bases for general jurisdiction.
The rule is not that an unincorporated entity may be subject to general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is formed or has its principal place of business; it is
simply that those places are paradigm all-purpose forums. In some circumstances, the contacts of an entity’s members with a forum may be so constant and
pervasive as to render the unincorporated entity “at home” in that forum as
well.161

First, we’ll address how and why the test should focus on an entity’s state
of formation and PPB, and then we’ll explain our modification. Then in Section
III.D, we offer more detailed guidance on how this test applies to a variety of
unincorporated entities.

158

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014); see also supra Section III.B (examining Daimler’s policy goals).
159 See supra Section III.B (examining Daimler’s policy goals).
160 See supra Section III.B and Section II.B.3 (examining district court decisions).
161 As indicated earlier, this proposed rule deliberately parrots the language the Supreme
Court adopted for corporations in Goodyear and Daimler.
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a. What is the Basic Test?
An unincorporated entity would be subject to general jurisdiction where it
is “at home” and “the place of formation and principal place of business”
should be the “paradigm bases” for general jurisdiction.
Much of this test could replicate the approach the Court has laid out for
corporations, and the test should be relatively easy to modify. First, the criteria
“state of incorporation” used by the Court for corporations will have to be altered to the “state of formation,” since unincorporated entities are not technically incorporated, but rather formed, under state law. In the vast majority of instances, state law requires unincorporated entities to file a formal formation
agreement, so this prong of the test will be easy to apply.162
Equally, courts are familiar with determining a corporation’s PPB and the
Supreme Court’s definition of a PPB as the “nerve center” where the “officers
direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities.”163 The test’s highly
practical focus on where the entity’s activities are controlled and directed
works well for most business entities, incorporated or not. Thus, adapting the
Supreme Court’s language in Hertz, an unincorporated entity’s PPB “should
normally be the place where the [entity] maintains its headquarters—provided
that the headquarters is the actual center of direction, control, and coordination,
i.e., the ‘nerve center.’ ”164
The Hertz Court was careful to explain that the PPB should not be “simply
an office where the [entity] holds its . . . meetings (for example, attended by
[members] who have traveled there for the occasion).”165 Equally, while some
types of unincorporated entities may present application issues because they
have more diffuse control, the Hertz Court acknowledged that this was present
in some corporations. The Court explained, “there will be hard cases. . . . in this
era of telecommuting, some corporations may divide their command and coordinating functions among officers who work at several different locations, perhaps communicating over the Internet.”166 Nevertheless, the Court felt that,
even in such cases, the district courts could successfully locate a “center of
overall direction, control, and coordination” of the entity, (ignoring other fac162

For further discussion, see infra Section III.D (discussing how to deal with entities that
have different formation agreements, and sometimes, no formal formation agreement).
163 Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010).
164 Id. at 93.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 95–96. For a discussion of Hertz, arguing that the test will be more difficult to apply to corporations than expected, see Michael E. Chaplin, Resolving the Principal Place of
Business Conundrum: Adopting a Single Test for Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 30 REV.
LITIG. 75, 95 (2010) (discussing challenges in applying the Hertz test to large entities with
“dispersed command and control functions.”); Caitlin Sawyer, Don’t Dissolve the “Nerve
Center”: A Status-Linked Citizenship Test for Principal Place of Business, 55 B.C. L. REV.
641, 642–43 (2014) (discussing challenges in applying the Hertz test to entities with only an
internet presence and with entities that are dissolving or ceasing operations); Strong, supra
note 68, at 1084–85 (discussing concerns in application of the Hertz test to corporations).
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tors such as “corporate functions, assets, or revenues”), and successfully apply
the test.167
In many, if not most, cases, the PPB test should be simple to apply to unincorporated entities. Scholars (writing in the field of subject matter jurisdiction)
have long argued that such a “state of formation and PPB” test can be applied
to unincorporated entities.168 Moreover, Congress itself has already twice
tasked the courts with determining an unincorporated entity’s state of formation
and PPB, so this task should be a somewhat familiar one.169 Indeed, as discussed previously, the problem most federal courts have experienced is not that
unincorporated entities have difficulty in determining their state of formation
and PPB, but rather that the entities often erroneously cite these as their citizenship for diversity purposes, perhaps in part because they are so easy to ascertain.170 For those entities where a PPB is difficult to determine,171 we believe
that the addition of the “also at home” provision to the test can accommodate
these outliers.172
b. Why the Proposed Test Meets the Policy Goals of Daimler
Adopting a test for general jurisdiction based on an unincorporated entity’s
state of formation and PPB seems to align with many of the Court’s announced
goals for general jurisdiction.173 First, such a test promotes simplicity and predictability in the sense that all entities—corporate or otherwise—will follow the
same core rule (an approach Congress already adopted for venue and in CAFA
actions). The test, as explained above, will be easy to apply because it repli-

167

Hertz, 559 U.S. at 96.
As one scholar observed of applying the state of formation and PPB to LLC’s: “This approach is still simple in theory. Additionally, it is simpler in practice. Logistically it is easier
to determine the state of organization and principal place of business than the citizenship of
each member of an LLC. It also reduces the likelihood of manufactured diversity. The approach also more accurately reflects the realities of modern business organizations and more
consistently promotes the purpose of diversity jurisdiction.” Cohen, supra note 66, at 307;
see also Hoffman, supra note 66, at 133 (the test is easy to apply to MLPs); Strong, supra
note 68, at 1084–85 (noting that many states require commercial trusts “to file some sort of
statement regarding their business conduct within the state, which would assist with the task
of identifying which state was the trust’s primary place of business,” but noting that it may
be hard to apply given their diversified power structure).
169 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10) (2018); 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) (2018). These provisions are
discussed supra Section II.A.1.b and supra Section II.A.2, respectively.
170 See supra text accompanying note 151(citing examples of cases where counsel have mistakenly alleged an unincorporated entity’s state of formation and PPB, rather than the members’ citizenships); see also Cohen, supra note 6, at 283 (discussing LLCs).
171 See supra note 166.
172 As we detail below in Section III.C.2.c because there are so many distinct forms of unincorporated entities, some may present unique application challenges.
173
See supra Section III.B (examining Daimler’s policy goals).
168

20 NEV. L.J. 693

Spring 2020]

FINDING A “HOME”

723

cates an inquiry that the courts are already used to undertaking for corporations
and even, in some cases, for unincorporated entities.174
The use of state of formation and PPB as the paradigms for general jurisdiction will also likely produce only a limited number of forums. As discussed
above, the Court’s test for PPB is designed to yield only one location; and,
while an entity could be formed under the law of more than one state, this is not
typical.175
Therefore, the “at home as the state of formation and PPB” paradigm for
entities seems to promote the Court’s announced goals of simplicity, certainty,
predictability, limited forums, and a similar level of contacts as the Court has
deemed acceptable for corporations.176
One counter-argument is that such a test would lead to some confusion, at
least in federal courts, because an unincorporated entity would be treated differently from corporations for purposes of diversity-jurisdiction citizenship, but
the same as a corporation for purposes of general personal jurisdiction.177 However, state courts would not face this potential confusion, and federal courts are
already used to sometimes treating an unincorporated entity like a corporation
when they apply the federal venue provisions and CAFA.178 Moreover, there is
a chance that Congress may act to clarify the citizenship of unincorporated entities in diversity jurisdiction, and given the approach it adopted in CAFA, it
might adopt a universal rule of treating all entities alike for all of diversity jurisdiction, eliminating any confusion.179
Therefore, because this test is already seemingly endorsed by the majority
of trial courts and by the Court’s dicta in Daimler, and because it is best suited
to meet the Court’s stated goals, we recommend the Court adopt this approach
with the one modification suggested below.
c.

The “Also at Home” Provision

The second paragraph of our proposed test—the “also at home” provision—is intended to reach, in limited situations, forums other than the state of
formation and the PPB. This is an important addition, not currently present in
the majority of district court cases, and one we believe is necessary to ensure
the best application of the Daimler test for unincorporated entities.
Our additional “also at home” provision is consistent with the Court’s test
for corporations. As the Daimler court pointed out, “Goodyear did not hold that
a corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is
174

See supra Section III.C.2.a.
See supra Section III.C.2.a.
176 See supra Section III.B (examining Daimler’s policy goals).
177 See supra Sections II.A, III.C.2.
178 See supra Sections II.A, II.B.
179 See supra text accompanying notes 83–86 (discussing calls for Congress to alter the rule
for unincorporated entities).
175
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incorporated or has its principal place of business; it simply typed those places
as paradigm all-purpose forums.”180
For corporations, the “also at home” analysis may rarely be applied. In
fact, the Court may well have been thinking about its prior holding in Perkins, a
holding affirmed in both Daimler and Goodyear, as the example of when a corporation could be “at home” in a forum despite not being incorporated or having its PPB in that the forum.181 In Perkins, the corporation was forced to cease
its mining operations and to function out of its President’s home in Ohio by the
invasion of the Philippines during WWII.182 Thus, whatever headquarters it
had, the only place it was really functioning was in Ohio. The Court treated this
as the “home” of the corporation and found general personal jurisdiction to exist in Ohio.183
While it may be the rare case where a corporation is at home in a forum
other than its PPB or state of incorporation, we believe that the nature of some
unincorporated entities may suggest that another forum operates as their
“home.” As we detail in the section below, some unincorporated entities have
diffuse control structures, making it hard to ascertain where the members direct
the business of the entity. The “also at home” analysis provides the court with
an additional option for identifying the existence of general personal jurisdiction for unincorporated entities.
In addition to responding to the unique operation of some unincorporated
entities, we believe that this additional “also at home” provision is essential to a
balanced operation of general jurisdiction. At the same time as the Court has
taken a decidedly narrower approach to interpreting general jurisdiction, criticizing courts that extended the general jurisdiction test when contacts were only “continuous and systematic,”184 it has also adopted a narrower approach to
specific personal jurisdiction.185 The effect of these simultaneous trends in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence is to close the courthouse doors to more cases.
Some foreign defendants are able to slip into the void left between these two
doctrines, evading general jurisdiction by not being formed in nor having the
PPB in any state and evading specific jurisdiction by using third parties to conduct business activities on their behalf in the United States.186 The test we pro180

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (citations omitted).
Id. at 129; Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 925 (2011).
182 Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447–48 (1952).
183 Id. at 448.
184 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 131.
185 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 883 (2011) (plurality opinion) (narrowing the scope of specific personal jurisdiction analysis by clarifying that the court should
only consider contacts directed at the forum, and not more diffuse contacts directed towards
the nation).
186 See id. at 906 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that “[c]ourts, both state and federal . . .
have rightly rejected the conclusion that a manufacturer selling its products across the USA
may evade jurisdiction in any and all States, including the State where its defective product
is distributed and causes injury. They have held, instead, that it would undermine principles
181
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vide remains consistent with Daimler and provides plaintiffs with an opportunity to identify a constitutionally permissible forum when the unincorporated entity is “at home” in the forum.
While we recognize that there may be more instances in which an unincorporated entity is subject to general personal jurisdiction under this “also at
home” extension than a corporation, we caution against an overly broad interpretation of the rule. Given the Court’s more limited interpretation of general
jurisdiction in Daimler, courts applying this rule should be mindful of the operating principles we identified above and interpret this rule in a narrow manner
consistent with those principles. We provide some guidance to the application
of the “also at home” test in the next section.
D. Application of the Proposed Test
In this section, we explore how our proposed test would operate when applied to various unincorporated entities. As Justice Scalia explained in his
Carden opinion, the challenge for federal courts will always be the pace at
which states are authorizing new forms of business entities, especially ones that
adopt some of the characteristics of corporations.187 Any application we offer
will be limited by the fact that new forms of business entities will spring up after our explanation. However, given that unincorporated entities are outpacing
corporations in the vast majority of states,188 we believe it is imperative to offer
federal districts courts some guidance. This section offers broad characterizations of common unincorporated entities and some suggestions for determining
where general personal jurisdiction may exist over these entities.
1. General Partnerships
A general partnership is a “default form of organization for multi-owner
businesses.”189 Unlike other forms of unincorporated entities, a general partnership can be created “inadvertently” through conduct190 or through an express
written agreement.191 Under the default rules of state partnership law, all part-

of fundamental fairness to insulate the foreign manufacturer from accountability in court at
the place within the United States where the manufacturer’s products caused injury.”).
187 Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 196–97 (1990) (Scalia noted that the Carden
rule “can validly be characterized as technical, precedent-bound, and unresponsive to policy
considerations raised by the changing realities of business organization.”).
188 “[M]ost new businesses in the United States that choose to operate via a legal entity (and
not as a sole proprietorship or general partnership) choose the LLC form.” BOUCHOUX &
CHUNG, supra note 78, at 24. “[T]he number of new LLCs formed in the United States now
outpaces the number of new corporations created by nearly two to one.” Id. at 698.
189 Id. at 12.
190 Id. at 13.
191
Id.
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ners have an equal right to make management decisions192 and share “unlimited
personal liability for partnership debts.”193
Because the general partnership can be formed without formal filings with
a secretary of state,194 and can even be created without the partners’ appreciation of or intention to create a partnership,195 the proposed test will operate in a
different manner than identifying the state of incorporation for corporations.
For the “state of formation” test, a general partnership would be subject to “at
home” jurisdiction where either a partnership agreement was executed or the
actions necessary to establish the common law standard for an “inadvertent
partnership” took place. We believe that, despite the unique fluidity with which
a general partnership can spring up, the “state of formation” test will still be
fairly easy to apply. In fact, courts already identify the state of formation when
determining which state’s partnership laws will govern the operation of the
partnership.196 This same determination can be used to support a finding of
general jurisdiction over the partnership.
Under the next portion of the proposed general jurisdiction test, a partnership would be “at home” in the place of its PPB—that is, its nerve center, or the
place from where the activities of the partnership are directed and controlled.
For a general partnership, this would be where the majority of business decisions are made. General partnerships, under default rules of operation, are very
different from corporations. The decision-making authority of the partnership is
split equally among the partners,197 creating a more fractured form of operation
where the entity’s actions are tied to multiple general partners in a way that is
dissimilar from a corporation that is controlled through directors at the corporate headquarters (PPB). As a practical matter, most partners will likely direct
the operations of the partnership in the same state. This affords an easy application of the PPB test: the state where the partnership is managed. If the partners
are conducting partnership business in different states, it is also likely that they
have designated a principal office for the partnership.198 The principal office
would be the PPB, similar to the corporate headquarters. Therefore, when the
general partnership agreement establishes a principal office in one state or establishes management rights such that the majority of partnership decisions
emanate from one state, the PPB would be in that state.

192

Id.
Id. at 14.
194 Id. at 12–13.
195 Id. at 13.
196 Id. Choice of law is typically determined by looking to the “law of the state in which the
partnership was formed” or the law of the state where the partnership’s principal office is
located. Of course, a partnership agreement can alter these default rules. Id.
197 Id. Again, this default division of management can be altered by partnership agreement.
198 See id. (discussing the reliance on the partnership “principal office” to determine choice
of law).
193
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There may be instances, however, when the management of the partnership
obscures the determination of the single PPB. For example, this may occur
when the partnership is being actively directed by partners from multiple states
and there is no designated principal office. In these situations, we believe that a
plaintiff may well choose to rely on the “also at home test” under the proposed
rule.199 So long as the partnership activity in the forum is “so substantial” that it
is the functional equivalent of the partnership’s “home,” the court should exercise general jurisdiction over the partnership in that forum.
2. Limited Partnerships
A limited partnership is a business organization comprised of “one or more
general partners and one or more limited partners.”200 While the general partners have rights and responsibilities similar to those in a general partnership,
limited partners do not have management rights and are shielded from personal
liability for the debts of the partnership.201 Unlike the general partnership, a
limited partnership must file a certificate of limited partnership with the secretary of state to obtain limited liability for the limited partners.202 Therefore,
there are no “inadvertent” limited partnerships.
Because the limited partnership has a formal aspect to its formation, it presents fewer challenges to courts and litigants applying the proposed general jurisdiction test. Under the first part of the test, the “state of formation” test, litigants and the court should be able to readily identify the state where the
partnership filed its certificate of limited partnership.
Under the second part of the test, the “principal place of business” test, the
court should examine the partnership agreement or state filing to determine if
there is a designated principal office. If one is not readily apparent, the court
should look to the management of the general partners to determine where the
majority of business operations are controlled and directed. That state would be
the state of the PPB.
Similar to the general partnership, a limited partnership’s general partners
may manage the partnership in such a manner that the determination of a PPB
199

Let’s consider an example using Partnership P discussed above. Presume that Partnership
P is formed under the laws of Illinois with its PPB in Ohio, (with individual partners domiciled in Ohio, Missouri, Washington, North Dakota and Texas). The suggested rule would
make Partnership P “at home” in Illinois (where it is formed) and Ohio (the location of its
PPB). However, let’s presume that the active partners who control the partnership are domiciled in Missouri and Ohio. The other partners (Washington, North Dakota and Texas) are
just investors with little or no say in the partnership business. Under the “also at home rule”
if the plaintiff can show that the Missouri partner does a vast amount of the partnership’s
business out of Missouri and exercises control of Partnership P from Missouri, the Partnership could also be subject to “at home” general jurisdiction in Missouri.
200 BOUCHOUX & CHUNG, supra note 78, at 18.
201 Id.
202 Id.; see also Hoffman, supra note 66, at 128 (discussing the master limited partnership
along with general characteristics of limited partnerships).
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may be difficult to assess. For example, when the general partners maintain
equal management of the partnership but operate in several states, identifying
one state as a “nerve center,” or PPB, may not be possible. Again, the plaintiff
may well consider using the “also at home” aspect of the proposed test and
identify a forum where the partnership business is “so substantial” that it is the
functional equivalent of the partnership’s “home.”
3. Limited Liability Partnerships
A limited liability partnership, or LLP, operates similarly to general partnerships in terms of management.203 In an LLP, the partners have equal rights
to manage the partnership, much like general partners.204 The key distinction,
however, is that in an LLP, the partners do not have unlimited liability for the
partnership’s debts.205 To form an LLP, the partners must file a statement of
qualification with the secretary of state’s office.206
Much like the limited partnership, the first part of the proposed test, “state
of formation,” should be easy to identify. This will be the state in which the
statement of qualification is filed. The “principal place of business” test will
apply to limited liability partnerships much as it does to limited partnerships.
The primary difference between limited partnerships and LLPs is that all of the
partners’ management activities will count in assessing a PPB or determining
the “home” of the LLP.
4. Limited Liability Companies
Limited Liability Companies, or LLCs, more than any other unincorporated entity, most closely resemble the corporation. Similar to a corporation, an
LLC must file “articles of organization” with the secretary of state’s office.207
However, an LLC offers the owners some features of partnerships, including
management rules, while providing some of the benefits of corporations, such
as limited personal liability for LLC debt and perpetual existence of the company.208
In terms of management options, there are two types of LLCs—membermanaged and manager-managed.209 The default state rules in most states direct
that an LLC will be member-managed, where the members have equal rights to
203

BOUCHOUX & CHUNG, supra note 78, at 16.
Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 24.
208 Id.; see Cohen, supra note 66, at 290 (noting that “the LLC, like the limited partnership,
is a hybrid organization that combines attributes of partnerships and corporations” however,
given the changes to tax law and state business law, most LLCs today “are more analogous
to corporations than limited partnerships.”).
209
BOUCHOUX & CHUNG, supra note 78, at 24.
204
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management similar to general partners in a partnership.210 However, most
states permit LLCs to be manager-managed if designated as such in their “articles of organization.”211 Under the manager-managed LLC, members manage
by voting, similarly to a corporation.212 LLCs became a much more attractive
form of business organization when the IRS allowed LLCs to elect to be treated
as a partnership or as a corporation for tax purposes.213
Because there is a clear state of formation, similar to corporations, the first
test of general jurisdiction will be easy to identify. The state in which the “articles of organization” are filed would meet this test. Additionally, in determining the PPB, the analysis would be virtually identical to that of a corporation
for manager-managed LLCs. As for member-managed LLCs, the process
would be similar to that for general partnerships.
Following Daimler, several district courts have applied the first two parts
of the proposed test to LLCs with little difficulty.214 The parties alleged the
state(s) of formation and PPB and had little factual disagreement as to the appropriate forum. Given the similarities between corporations and LLCs, this is
not surprising.
5. Considerations with Other Unincorporated Entities and Future
Unincorporated Entities
As noted above, states offer many more varieties of unincorporated entities
and will continue to do so. In this section, we offer some general guidance for
litigants and courts to use in applying the proposed test to other unincorporated
entities or to those created in the future.
First, it is important to recognize that any incorporated entity should follow
the Daimler test. This includes even more specialized forms of corporations,
including statutory closed corporations, professional corporations, benefit corporations, and nonprofit corporations.215
Second, if an unincorporated entity must file a formal document with the
secretary of state (or other state agency) to be a recognized organization under
state law, the state where such documentation is filed will count as the “state of
formation.” If the unincorporated entity must file or register to do business in
the state, however, such filings should not be considered in determining whether the entity is “at home” in that state. Corporations have historically filed such
papers and the Court has never afforded them any consideration in the “at
210

Id.
Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 25; Cohen, supra note 66, at 290 (noting the upward trend to form an LLC after the
1997 changes to the tax code).
214 See supra Section II.B.3 (discussing the conflicted application of the Daimler decision to
unincorporated entities).
215 See Cohen, supra note 66, at 300–02 (discussing these specialized corporations and applying the approach in Carden).
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home” general jurisdiction analysis.216 The same should be true for unincorporated entities. To do otherwise would run contrary to the Court’s admonishment
of not treating business activities, even when “continuous and systematic,” as a
basis for general jurisdiction.217
To determine the “principal place of business,” the court should consider
the management of the entity.218 If the entity has multiple authorized managers
(like general partners), the court should look to each and determine if there is
one state where the majority of management decisions are made. This is similar
to the Hertz nerve center test.219 If no one state can meet this test because there
are similar management decisions by similarly empowered managers/members
in multiple states, there will likely not be a PPB for purposes of the proposed
test.
Finally, the proposed test does not limit the analysis to the state of formation or the PPB. While these are the paradigm places for “at home” general
personal jurisdiction for the incorporated entity, the court may consider the “also at home” test. When using this part of the proposed test, the court should be
certain to follow the restraint suggested by the Daimler Court and only find
general personal jurisdiction when enough of the entity’s management decisions are made such that the entity would be considered “at home” in that state.
CONCLUSION
Despite the substantial growth of unincorporated entities in the United
States,220 the Supreme Court has left uncertainty for courts and parties in determining where an unincorporated entity is “at home” for purposes of general
personal jurisdiction. In its 2014 decision of Daimler AG v. Bauman, the Court
clarified that corporations should be considered “at home” in their state of incorporation and their PPB.221 While some courts have tried to fashion a similar
test for unincorporated entities, there has been inconsistency and little support
for the tests used.222 This article provides a proposed test to fill this void and
give guidance to courts and parties.

216

While some jurisdictions have permitted personal jurisdiction over an entity that is registered to do business in the state under a theory of consent, our focus is on the exercise of “at
home” general personal jurisdiction, which is based on the substantial number of contacts the
defendant has with the forum. See, e.g., Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General
Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1363–64, 1369–70,
1407 (2015). In these instances, the Court has never found “at home” jurisdiction based on
the mere “doing of business” in the forum.
217 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014).
218 See Strong, supra note 68, at 1082 (discussing how to work out the state of formation
and PPB for commercial trusts following the Americold decision).
219 Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93 (2010).
220 BOUCHOUX & CHUNG, supra note 78, at 24.
221 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137 (citations omitted).
222
See supra Section II.B.3.
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This Article proposes that an unincorporated entity be considered “at
home,” and subject to general personal jurisdiction, in the “state of its formation,” its PPB, and in a state where its contacts are “so substantial” that it
would be considered “also at home.” The proposed test harmonizes the goals
established by the Daimler Court, namely simplicity, certainty, predictability,
limited forums, and a focus on a forum with an extremely high level of defendant contacts,223 with the need to provide a clear and predictable test for courts
and parties. Additionally, this article discusses how the proposed test would
operate and provides examples using a variety of unincorporated entities.224
Despite the wide variety of unincorporated entities recognized under state law
and the rapidly evolving nature of such entities, we believe the proposed test
will be relatively easy to apply in the majority of instances. Moreover, we believe the guidance provided by the proposed test offers much needed clarity for
courts attempting to apply the principles of Daimler to unincorporated entities.

223
224

See supra Section III.B.
See supra Section III.D.
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